The following is a copy of an overly long response to comments following my own comment on a shale gas meeting in London between the government ministers and the large gas producers.  Smaller producers were excluded.  I considered this to be because only the “big boys” have what it takes to seriously “do” shale gas.  At the same time I made points about the expectations and public promise of shale gas was not the reality, especially that shale gas will increase energy costs because it is fundamentally a more difficult and expensive resource to exploit than former conventional sources.  Some of the readers were perplexed.  So I answered

At length.

Go to Arthur Berman formerly a writer for World Oil, Shale Gas (various: an early one, http://www.aspousa.org/index.php/2009/11/facts-are-stubborn-things-arthur-e-berman-november-2009/) if you want some good info. He was terminated from World Oil for publicly saying what all of us in the industry knew: with shale gas, what you hear is not what is or will be. (Unless the stars align, to give gas companies an out.)

Other than that ….
I’ve had a look at the responses to my comments, and they are dead on – if you look at shale gas the way companies and our governments want us to. Fact is, unless you peer very closely at the words, what you think you are reading, isn’t quite what you are reading.

Fundamentally, the difference between what I’m saying and what you are hearing is that I refer to the overall project, the overall cost and the overall results of a shale gas project. The words you read – like Mr. Axel’s reference to “Two trillion cuft of gas online” (Kung Fu, 22-05-2012 @ 2:00 pm)and Caudrilla’s Bowland 200+ BCF Gas Initially In Place (anonym, 21-05-2012 @ 8:21 PM), is about gas volumes in the ground, not the gas that is available to go down the pipelines to your homes. See below for the Recovery Factor comments. Elsewhere, gas prices that collapsed (Lord Beaverbrook, 21-05-2012 @ 8:13 PM) are referring to the prices paid by consumers for the gas they use, not the COST of the gas to the producers: you’d think they would be similar, but in an oversupply situation, they are not, not by a longshot. Also see below. High costs that involve local labour and equipment (first, it’s mostly large corporations anyway, so the profit leaves your town except for field maintenance) (RobL 21-05-2112 @ 7:52 PM, you still pay the high prices though your neighbour is employed, and that dollar from you pocket is still the dollar that your butcher doesn’t get. Finally (Latimer Alder 21-05-2012 @ 6:59 PM), the US is not different from Britain except that taxes are less in the States, access is easier and reserve volumes are greater.

See below for details. But note I make no specific comments about any particular company or field. My comments are general and generally true. There is the press and there is the profit. Not the same. The overall theme is this: what we have now is more expensive and more difficult to get than what came before, and those costs will be, must be, passed on to the consumer. The oil and gas companies are not going to be hurt individually, though as a group they can be pushed away: the field that is unavailable to everyone hurts none of them. Selective discrimination is a problem, not a collective one. You can’t tax a company into not producing a resource if the company can increase its price to the consumers: only regulation or a price freeze will keep a marketable product from being produced. Whatever you might hear about shale gas being a green boom is overrated, and will, has to, cannot be otherwise than, requiring more money out of your pocket, regardless of carbon based taxes.

Below I have some background for y’all. I’ve loaded this on my own website, a rarely used thing, as blogging with technical details is a full job in itself which my career in the oil and gas business has NOT enabled me to do, any more than someone running a corner store.
1. Economics of Shale Gas

You read numbers a lot. Economic thresholds for shale gas plays to go forward. Before you can really understand them, though, you have to know what they are talking about, for there are various types of economic assessments. Essentially all are time-related, but within that time-frame come, necessarily, costs as well as revenues.

1. Long-term. This might be called “full-cycle”. In a “play”, as the general project is called in the oil and gas industry, you have mineral right acquisition costs, surface access costs, drilling, completion and equipping costs, facilities and pipeline costs, operating costs, remedial surface repair and abandonment costs. You also have land taxes. To offset these costs you have production sales. Production is highest in the beginning and then falls either exponentially or, if you are lucky, hyperbolically, in which declines almost level out after a few years. Conventional and unconventional productions decline similarly at first, but the resource plays such as shale gas, are supposed to decline hyperbolically. Hyperbolic declines give you long-term production. Shale gas and coal-bed methane are both supposed to have reserve lives in the 40 year range.

Full-cycle economics is what it all is really about. You put a buck in and when it is all over, interim costs considered, how much did you get out? Full-cycle has the full revenue and the full costs, but there are a couple of big assumptions. First and foremost is the production decline: will it really last 40 years? Second is the price forecast, and this is where an individual company can make or break the apparent worthiness of the project: is the commodity price going to 6 bucks in two years or will it stay at 2? And 10 years out, what will it be? The discount factor (DCF) for the project is important, too: while the dollar may rise, what about the purchasing price of the dollar, so you are comparing apples to apples?

 

Shale gas (like CBM) is generally presented as the volume you get over 40 years, with a 40 year price forecast. Costs are recovered first, profits last. So the real profits are at the second half of production life. If there isn’t any production, or if the prices are low, your economics are either low or negative, regardless of what the project was “supposed” to be like. The money is made in the future.

2. Short-term. This is how you and I generally think about the economics of a project when we ask, does it make money.

a. Short-cycle. Generally less than 6 years. The idea is that you want to get your money back within 6 years. Because of the DCF, money spent today must have a certain rate of growth to be have the same purchasing power later. And that is before profit. And because of the rapid decline of these new resource plays, getting twice as much for the product later doesn’t do you much good if the production rate is one-quarter of its original. If you don’t at least get your money back (value neutral) in 6 years, you might have been better to put your effort into a toothpaste factory.

Shale gas doesn’t do well on the short-cycle because the upfront costs and decline rates are very high. You need good commodity prices to get a positive short-term economic forecast. This is why resource plays, like shale gas, typically give the 40-year picture. There is more wiggle room.

3. Finding and Development. Known as F & D. This is the upfront costs to getting the well or field on production. $/mcfd, or dollar per volume of gas produced per day. Long-term costs are not considered. Peak production is the rate you use. As you can imagine, a very high rate, which shale gas has, gives a positive number relative to a conventional source, but the number doesn’t necessarily represent the profitability or even the total profit you might get.

4. Drilling, Completion and Equipping. D,C & E. This number gives you the project cost but doesn’t include facilities, pipelines, land, etc. It gives you the costs to production once you have the legal right to go after it. This number lets you determine if you can afford the discovery and/or the development of the project. Shale gas drilling and completing is a multi-million dollar operation. It is a scale enterprise: decline rates demand a lot of locations and a lot of replacement locations as the field declines rapidly.

5. Operating. This is the net-back view. All the money is spent, water (cash) under the bridge. You have operating costs, not including future abandonment and reclamation costs or equipment sales, and you have production revenue. Each day you make a buck and you spend less than a buck, if you are going forward, and the reverse, if you are going in the whole.

The economic assessment you read about, which is relevant to how much gas has to be sold for to be worthwhile, is one of the above five types. Corporate discussions always give you the numbers that sound the best or are perceived as representing the best scenario for the company. If the gas prices are in the toilet, then short-term is not what you will hear. F & D is helpful for knowing how much muscle you need to bring to get the thing going. Operating is good once the thing is established and maintenance is all you need to worry about for a few years. If you want to sell a project on its future merits, then full-cycle is what you use. It is in the differences between these economic assessment types that the devil lives.

What is the true economic costs of shale gas? Now we have to be even more specific. There is the core area, and there are fringe areas. The core area is the high productivity, high reserve portion. Like everything in life, there is the best part and the not-so-best part and finally the poor part. All rolled in you may think that you have a field that requires $5/mcf to make money, but what you really have is a core that requires $2, a surround that requires $4 and a fringe that requires $7. Why would you drill the fringe, then, when prices are, say $4/mcf? Well, companies need volume to maintain image and production in-place to take advantage of positive price spikes.

I’ve seen this personally. Areas that clearly do not make money are brought developed because, rolled into other areas that make more money, the whole enterprise makes a ton of money. Plus, if prices spike, then suddenly the no-profit areas become profitable. Finally, money to large corporations, not just oil and gas, is like water in a river. There is more coming tomorrow, and all that money today doesn’t really have a place to go (not all the time). You could dividend, but, no. So you plow it into things that tomorrow may be good, even though today they are not good. Regardless, in a year or two the moneybags are full again. (Obviously if you do this too many times you go bankrupt – witness Detroit. But if you only do it a few times, the future wins at least make up for the current losses. At least that is the strategy.)

So what is the cost level for shale gas to make sense? The core-non-core ratio is the key. When corporations speak of the threshold, they speak to the better parts. The truth is generally worse because the best parts have to support the lesser parts. As for shale-gas vs conventional gas: a shale gas well is a closely spaced, horizontally drilled well with a large frac required. If a conventional well to that depth costs $1, a horizontal shale gas well can be $4 to $6 (or more). The production rate may be 4 – 10X in a shale gas well, but the volume received may be more of the 3X ratio. All these numbers mean that short-term, you get much more from a horizontal shale gas well, perhaps 10X, but long-term you get only 1.5X the volume, and at 2X the cost. The ratio is off: more gas, more expensive. And since the decline rates of shale gas wells are higher than for conventional wells, more expensive more often.

That’s the rub.

Breman noted this difference when he got into trouble at World Oil. The long-term could use a PRESENT low price because the price forecast increases and best-efforts volume forecast made up for the short-term deficiencies. These were assumptions which are not necessarily valid. But you have to realize that a corporation thinks far longer ahead than an individual, and so can do that. The average Joe and smaller company knows that the short-term, like for breathing, is where you live and die.

A price basis of $4 to more than $7/mcf is not unreasonable for what you need as a go-ahead business. At $10/mcf a great deal is worthwhile producing. Current prices in NAmerica are less than $2/mcf. (Before you consider what Europe and Britain are paying, you have to make sure that the taxes are similar. Which they are not.)

Operating profits don’t count when it comes to the overall scheme. And current sales prices don’t tell you anything, either, about the costs of exploration, development and production.

There is a supply glut of gas right now. If it weren’t for the recession, that would not be the case. And you don’t just shut-in a well. Most companies borrow the money they use, so have a need for constant cashflow. Even though the well you produce is getting little for its gas, you need the money to pay bills. You also don’t shut-in fields if you can help it, because often they cannot be turned back on, especially if there is co-production of water. Which a lot of shale gas wells do. But where does it go? It goes back into the ground in specially built salt-dissolved caverns, or in abandoned oil/gas fields. You produce out over here and dump it in, over there. Now you have a large supply ready to produce at a moment’s notice … whenever that is. Also an “asset” that costs money to be saved, and an asset that is not generating any revenue. So you drop your price to get as much as YOU can into the market without giving away the farm.

Notice this has nothing to do with the cost of production. The price of gas is now determined by how desperate you are to get cash in the front door.

Shale gas has driven market prices down while driving the cost of gas production up. In the short-term, producers are “losing money”, meaning that if the low prices continue until the field is depleted, there will have been more money spent on getting the gas to market than the market paid for the gas. In the short-term, consumers are happy with “cheap” gas. But once the gas “bubble” as they call it, is gone, prices will reflect the cost plus profit of what is being produced. That is why gas prices must go up if shale gas is to become a major part of our energy needs.

So, wwhat do I think of shale gas and its potential?

Shale gas is a “resource” play that is going to save our butts. It is everywhere. All you have to do is get permission to drill and your company’s and nation’s energy problems are solved.

Yeah, right. First, if it were that easy, it would already have been done. We’ve actually known about these reservoirs for decades – we drilled through them and had big problems with gas coming into the drilling fluids, reducing its weight, creating a danger at surface. (This is true of methane in coals, by the way.) We didn’t have the good technology to get the gas out of these shales before, however, and we didn’t have the prices for gas to justify the effort, either. Now we can get it out … but shale gas reservoirs are like conventional reservoirs: they have core good bits, lesser bits, bad bits and areas of no bits. The companies/countries may boast of their gas-in-place numbers, but what counts is their economically producible gas-in-the-pipeline volumes (and rates). This is often called the recoverable gas, with a recovery factor (RF) showing the percentage of gas you can get out. Not just at A price, but ANY price.

What is the RF for shale gas? Obviously it is different for different places. 65%? In the core? 20%? over the field? Right now we don’t know. The fields are all still in their initial years, but some already don’t look like they were initially hoped/hyped to be (standard practice: optimism first, realism later).

What I can say, though, is that resource plays – actually any oil and gas idea these days – always appears more promising than it turns out to be. That is because it is not easy to find or easy to produce or easy to transport – those ones have already been exploited. One resource play was large coalbed methane fields in the States and Canada. The in-place “resource” is huge. The RF in the core might be 26%, but much of it is actually <9%. Overall, the RF might be 3%. This in-place vs producible situation is the same with shale gas said to be under half of Britain. Yes, the gas molecules are everywhere. No, you can’t get them out. (In theory, of course, you can. Gimme $200/mcf and I can deliver a great deal, not all, but more. And see what this does for energy costs?)

Shale gas is an excellent reserve of natural gas for the world. It is cleaner than oil, though not as useful and not as energy dense. It will add to our future, but not remove all our concerns. For individual companies or countries, check to see what practical reserves are being discussed, not how many molecules are in the ground. And don’t think it is cheaper than what you got before.

Your energy costs MUST rise if shale gas is an important component of your energy sources as it is harder to get out and goes away faster than our previous gas reservoirs. And the fringes cost more to get less than the core, just like with everything else. Shale gas will also – once supply gets in line with demand – raise the overall price for gas, to the benefit of the conventional producers, as gas at market has the same value regardless of its source. And since all the places where gas could substitute for oil have already been taken care of, gas prices will do nothing for oil prices, up or down.

2. I’m a shill for Big Oil. How weird is that?

Yeah, I’m a skeptic about CAGW, but I’ll tell you as I’ve told others: oil and gas businesses will flourish under carbon taxes because the costs will be pushed onto the consumer – you. The only way that the oil and gas companies will really be hurt is if the governments put a PRICE freeze on the commodities. To-the-consumer price reflects cost plus profit. And, for the government, which likes percentage taxes, the higher the cost, the more gross revenue it gets. Even if you were to put a tariff on foreign oil, this would hurt the consumer, but not the oil and gas companies. In fact, a tariff would increase the value of the internally produced oil.

The oil and gas companies do not stand to lose from carbon dioxide capture rules because they can pass on the costs. The consumer cannot. If the consumer cuts back on demand, AND production remains high, then prices will fall. So jobs will be lost while the oil and gas companies contract to preserve profitability, energy costs to the consumer will fall … and demand will go back up. If production is curtailed, so there is a shortage nation-wide, then prices will go back up, the oil and gas companies will make a lot of money again, and the consumer will still be paying through the nose, except this time it won’t end.

I’m a professional geologist. I’m not rich and never will be. But CAGW doesn’t really affect me as an o and g guy. It sure affects me as a person, though, and my non oil and gas friends. Every dollar that I have to pay for energy is one less dollar I can pay to my favourite bartender or musician or magazine writer. Personally, I’d like to keep paying them rather than the government (in taxes) or Chevron (because someone forced them to develop expensive oil and gas fields).

Summing up:

Shale gas is expensive to produce. The economic downturn globally has reduced demand below supply, but gas fields cannot just be shut down. Gas goes into storage underground, but the buyer now can chiesel away at the price as there is always someone with lower profit demands or more urgency to sell. So prices drop below cost, while producing companies try to hang on until demand exceeds supply. And then prices will rocket.

Production costs you hear refer to the better parts of the field. Improvements in costs come from shared infrastructure and improved results, not reduced costs. That never goes down except in very bad recessions when it is a dog-eat-dog business and things like rig maintenance become next year’s business.

Gas-in-place is not gas in your stove burner. The Recovery Factors for shale gas are still to be determined. If 65% is said to be that of a field, that will be the core and that will require a lot of infill drilling. More gas = more cost. If 1/4 of all the areas I have seen reported as the total resource were produced, I’d be shocked. GIP is only meaningful in comparison to someone else’s GIP. If Recoverable Gas were so impressive, that would be the number you hear.

Sea Ice News Volume 3, #2
Posted on March 18, 2012 by AnthonySea Ice News Volume 3, #2
Posted on MarcSea Ice News Volume 3, #2
Posted on March 18, 2012 by Anthony Wattsh 18, 2012 by Anthony Watts Watts

I’ve taken the Goddard image from the 18 March, 2012 WUWT post in which the pre-satellite (pre-1979) Arctic sea-ice extent was Photoshopped onto the 1979+, satellite data, and then Photoshopped the display of earlier data to visually match the later. This gives the rise and fall of about 1.0E6 km2 to both sides of 1979. The trend of pre-79 was visually matched to that of (visualized) 1979+.

The importance of doing this is not to show that the two data sources, if discussed by the warmists without sniff-testing them, make the current situation look very ominous. If, however, allowance is given for underestimating in the pre-79 days relative to that of the satellite era, and modifying accordingly, the result is that:

1) the “anomalous” period appears to be post 2004,
2) a cyclicity in waxing and waning not considered by the warmists appears in the Arctic sea-ice extent data,
3) we do not appear to have a full cycle dataset yet, which makes impossible any settled or certain conclusion about the ominousness of the current sea-ice extent, and
4) the start date problem for interpreting the significance of sea-ice extent changes in the Arctic is very, very serious.

I once met a man in the Sawback Mountains of west-central Alberta while I was hiking through some wet, lush meadows between an elevated forest on my left and a rising stand of forest on my right. He was shirtless and riding bareback. He asked if I had seen a herd of horses that had escaped from his camp during the night, the horses having figured out by preparations that there was work to do in the morning. He had followed them down through the forest as they moved single file, making a good trail. As soon as they got to the soft ground, though, they split up. I hadn’t seen them; he said they were hiding, maybe even watching us from the treeline. He looked around and said, “You’d think it would be easy to track 20 horses. But it’s not.”

I saw him seven hours later, further up the valley, still shirtless and bareback. He still hadn’t found that herd.

I’ll always remember his comment. All those things that you’d think should be, or you, personally, find easy, aren’t necessarily easy. The truth is like that, too. Sometimes truth, like horses, hides and it takes a lot of skill, experience and shear doggedness to find it.

 

Attribution of Variations in Maximum Temperature Records 1932 – 2010 Central United Kingdom, with Implications for Global Warming

D.Proctor, P.Geol.
Calgary, Alberta; December 30, 2011

Abstract

Previously sourced and plotted data for averaged annual maximum temperature and hours of bright sunshine covering the period 1932 to 2010 for the Central United Kingdom were analyzed. Changes in the two relative to a stable period (1962 – 1973) amounted to increases of 0.98C and 108 hours in 2010.

Three factors were found to be associated with all temperature changes:

1. The duration of bright sunshine, such that C = 9.27E-3C X Sunshine hour – 0.10C. This factor was constant with time, but the changes in bright sunshine hours followed (with time) a quasi-sinusoidal pattern with indeterminate amplitude, but a peak-to-peak cycle of 62 years.
2. A quasi-sinusoidal (with time) Pacific Decadal Oscillation-Atlantic Multidecadal Occillation-like variation, with a cycle length of 56 years and amplitude of 0.31C.
3. A linear (with time), consistent increase of temperature, such that C = 9.53E-4 (Yr-1873) – 0.1425 C.

The majority of temperature change was due to the sunshine duration factor. The PDO-AMO-like varying factor contributed the second most significant portion of the temperature change record, sometimes adding and sometimes subtracting from the temperature changes associated with increased/decreased bright sunshine. The third factor was tied to the PDO-AMO-like factor as a long-term warming, but added only a minor amount, 0.095C/century.

 

The datum period 1962 – 1973 recorded a stable period of 1315.9 hours, i.e. a daytime cloudiness of 70.0%. From 1932 to 1948, and from 1980 to 2010, the Central United Kingdom experienced increased bright sunshine of about 42 and 108 hours, respectively. This is a bright sunshine increase of 3.2% gross and 0.96% net more sunshine for the earlier period, and 8.2% gross, and 2.5% net additional sunshine for the most recent period. Stated in the reverse, in the 1932-1948 periods when temperature rose 0.32C, there was 0.96% less cloudiness; in the 1980 – 2010 period, when the average maximum temperature rose 0.98C, 2.5% less cloudiness.

The PDO-AMO –like temperature changes did not match perfectly either the timing or amount of temperature change associated with heat release and storage for either the PDO or the AMO events as individual events. The changes appear more of a non-equal combination of both, though the combination was not determined within this study.

It is concluded that changes in the Central United Kingdom Maximum temperature history of the past 70 years is fundamentally a response to changes in the amount of sunshine (i.e., cloudiness) in association with rises and falls in temperature resulting from natural heat storage and release of the from the planet’s two largest oceans. The remaining, small portion of temperature rises seen in the Central UK may as well be attributed to land-use changes or inappropriate adjustments in the temperature records as it could to CO2-related changes in heat retention. Regardless of cause, this minor temperature rise, at 0.1C/century is of no consequence to the local biosphere.

Although the UK area studied is a small portion of an island mass with its own peculiar weather, the strong similarity in patterns, i.e. its climate patterns, to various GISTemp regional and whole-globe average temperature profiles suggests that the Central UK is a good proxy for what has happened across the planet and comes from common causes. Extended to 2060, it is proposed that an increase of cloudiness of about 2.5% and a decrease of temperature of about 1.0C will occur in the Central United Kingdom by 2040. Globally, cloudiness and temperature are expected to +1.7% and -0.70C, respectively.

Suggestions are offered as areas of similar study of the sunshine-PDO/AMO correlation and, hence, causation, of temperature variations of the near-past and probable near-future.

Introduction

The study of the recent phenomena called “Global Warming” is widely perceived as a study suitable only for experts in the atmospheric sciences. High-level computers and the ability to perform statistical gymnastics are said to be necessary to comprehend the temperature changes of the 20^th century. That one, with a simple working background in the natural sciences and familiarity with scientific inquiries, can contribute to the ongoing debate, armed only with a keen eye, sharp pencil and the ability to recognize a forest regardless of the types of trees present (including bristlecone), is anathema to the current anti-CO2 narratives. Though the most fundamental, revolutionary explanations of the world came from such non-technological researchers as Aristotle, Galileo and Darwin, currently only government-funded, PhD, peer-reviewed researchers are believed to have worthwhile opinions on the most significant environmental and social issue in humanity’s history. This study was undertaken, in part, to confront that conceit.

On the technical level, the study sprang from a recent, 2011 blog post of Tallbloke’s Talkshop [http://tallbloke.wordpress.com/2011/08/30/comparing-sunshine-hours-and-max-annual-temperature-in-the-uk/] In this post, a pair of profiles from the Central United Kingdom (1932 to 2010) meteorological database – the longest, most complete in the world – was presented. The annualized, maximum daily temperatures and the annualized, daily recorded number of bright sunshine hours were plotted against time. A 5-year running average had been added on each. The blog author noted that both the sunshine hours and maximum temperature profile showed similar cycles but the cycles were not quite synchronized; he speculated there might be something of interest to be found in its study. What follows is the result of following up on that speculation.

Methodology

The fundamental data captured from the referenced blog post is shown in Figure 1. “Maximum Temperature” refers to the grouped, annual average of the greatest temperature reached for each day. “Sunshine hours” has been defined as:

Average number of hours of bright sunshine each day in a calendar month or year, calculated over the period of record. Hours of bright sunshine is measured from midnight to midnight … bright sunshine has generally been recorded with a Campbell-Stokes recorder. This device only measures the duration of “bright” sunshine, which is less than the amount of “visible “sunshine.(http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/cdo/about/definitionsother.shtml)

When overlaid, the Maximum Temperature profile (Fig. 1a), shows strong pattern similarity to the GISTemp temperature anomaly profile for the Northern Latitudes (Fig. 2). The Central UK data, in pattern sense at least, is thus a reasonable proxy for regional (if not more) temperature profiles. What is learned from a study of the specific central United Kingdom data, therefore, is considered probably applicable to that of the general global data.

Figure 3 is an overlay of both sunshine hours (Fig. 1a) and maximum temperatures of the Central UK (Fig. 1b) area on a common time-axis. Both show a relatively stable period of about 1962 to 1973. This period, in which sunshine hours were about 1315.9 hours, and the average maximum temperature, 11.87*C, was selected as a reference datum for comparison purposed. It is noted that the reference datum of 1315.9 hours represents only 30.02% of potential bright sunshine hours per year, indicating, in other words, that the Central United Kingdom is cloudy 70% of the time (Combined with an average annual average temperature of less than 12*C, the two points explain why so many UK citizens take their annual holidays in southern Spain.)

The differences between the datum and the five-year running value of each parameter were measured on an enlarged version of Figure 3 (Fig. 16: pencil-and-ruler methods are crude compared to computer-held data points, but they appear to have been sufficient). Time intervals of 5 years were used initially, but additional points were measured as required to better plot the changes. These variations, i.e. “temperature anomalies” as known within standard global warming analyses, were dropped into an Excel spreadsheet and plotted (Fig. 4).

At first appearance the pattern appears rough, though within it a linear trend of increasing temperature with sunshine hours is apparent. When the dates of data points are added, however, it is clear that the pattern is not rough at all (Fig. 4d).

From 1932 until about 1948, temperatures and sunshine hours both increased, after which, until 1968, they decreased. The pattern is semi-elliptical, with a clear axial trend. This semi-ellipse describes a period of time here called “Cycle A”. From 1968 to 2010 both temperature and sunshine hours increase again, though in greater amounts, in a way similar to the first part of Cycle A. This second time period, referred here as “Cycle B”, can be fitted on the same axial trend line as Cycle A if the year 2010 is viewed – as it appears to be – the point of maximum sunshine-hours and maximum temperature of the cycle, analogous to the 1932 to 1948 period.

Two points are to be noted. The first is that Cycle A, shown in its (hypothesized) entirety, is not a true ellipse: the first part, the warming & more sunshine portion, is not a mirror image of the second part, the cooling & less sunshine part. The second point is that a negative temperature of -0.08C results from an extension of the axial trend line backward to the point of zero sunshine hours. Intuitively this does not make sense: when there are no additional hours of sunshine, the temperature should be equal to the datum, not less than the datum. This situation is considered an artefact of either the (crude) measurement method with small divergences from the datum, an overly aggressive smoothing function of the 5-year running average algorithm, or spurious adjustments in the base data. (The problem requires “b” values of – 0.10C and – 0.14C to be added to two mathematical relationships of the general y = mx + b type found in this study. Regardless of the cause, the situation/error does not detract from the general conclusions made later.)

Analyses

It is intuitive that, should the number of sunshine hours increase, maximum temperatures reached during that time would increase. It is also intuitive the effect on the temperature would be the same in a more-hours and less-hours scenario, though in an opposite way. The pattern would be the same “up” and “down”: there would be only one line (or curve). The pattern of Cycle A does not show this, however. Either the maximum temperature achieved is not a consistent function of the number of sunshine hours as the value of sunshine changes, i.e. the insolation power changes in time, or there is at least one other factor other than sunshine duration responsible for the maximum temperature recorded in the Central UK. It is well established that the top of atmosphere (TOA) solar insolation has been virtually constant on an annual basis for hundreds of years. Other factors than this must have been/are involved to create the Cycle A (and presumably the beginning of Cycle B) pattern.

Figure 5 shows a series of models considered from first principles to show the result of both linear and non-linear patterns that might be involved in the identified Maximum Temperature and Sunshine Hours cycle(s). Only one combination results in a pattern similar to Cycle A (and the beginning of Cycle B). Shown in Figure 6, two factors, one linear, the other non-linear, but stepping out of phase with each other over time, i.e. at times both warm, and at others, one warms while one cools, appear to be in play.

(A combination of several linear patterns creates one linear pattern; the same is true of multiple non-linear/sinusoidal patterns. For the purposes of satisfying the principle of Occam’s Razor, continued analyses followed from looking for one linear and one non-linear factor. As it turned out, this was appropriate.)

Breakdown of Factors

Measurements of the axial trend line seen initially in Figure 4c and deviations from the trend line (Fig. 7/7b) at each data point are plotted in Figures 7c and 7d.

The linear factor:

Crude measurements account for the scatter in 7C, the trend has been corrected as an idealized trend line with a relationship of:

T = 9.27E-3 (Hrs) – 0.10 C*

This reveals that a certain amount of the temperature changes recorded is completely related to the number of sunshine hours received – a not unexpected connection. Not all of the total temperature record is attributable to increases and decreases in sunshine hours, however.

The nonlinear factor &minor associated linear warming factors:

The portion of the temperature changes here discussed is that of the raw temperature change less that of the axial trend. The difference, plotted in Figures 7d and 8a, displays a quasi-sinusoidal pattern of temperature changes with time. Both Cycle A and, for the first portion present of Cycle B, show the same pattern but have different amplitudes. However, a consideration was made that only one quasi-sinusoidal factor attached to a linear temperature rise would account for the revealed pattern. This linear relationship (Figure 4d) was measured and calculated as an idealized function as:

T = 9.53E-4 (Yr – 1871) – 0.1425 C* (Fig. 8b), amounting to 0.095C/century.

With the linear function removed, Figure 8c shows the resultant de-trended, quasi-sinusoidal temperature pattern. The pattern has a peak-to-peak cycle length of 56 years and an amplitude of 0.31C. (A simple extension forward and backward from the nearest portion of the cycle was used to extend the graph backward and forward to 1860 and 2060, respectively, as discussed further in this report.)

The sunshine-temperature trend-line

As noted, although the relationship between the number of sunshine hours experienced and the maximum temperature reached (Fig. 7c and 9/9a) is clear, how this relationship shows in the records is also a function of the way the changes of bright sunshine amount occurs through time (Fig. 9d). Plotting the converted sunshine-induced heat against time (Fig. 9c) reveals another quasi-sinusoidal pattern, one similar to, but offset in time from, that of the first quasi-sinusoidal temperature variable discussed above. Peak-to-peak cycle time, at 62 years, is 11% longer from the other (of 56) and the “highs” and “lows” are somewhat different.

(Using the same concept of projecting forward and back as used for the non-sunshine related temperature changes, Figure 9d shows both data and expectations from principle over the period 1860 to 2060. The rationale for doing so is that whatever the cause, human or natural though it may be, it is likely that the pattern 50 years either way is not very different from what it was closest to those times. This is, in fact, the basis of the IPCC/Global Warming “scenarios”, except that the IPCC considers what happened pre-1970 was “natural”, and what happened(s) post-1970 principally of human origin. Orthodox climate interpretations are based on this idea; here the same principles are applied.)

Reconstructing the Central United Kingdom Maximum Temperature Record

The preceding suggests the maximum temperature profile for the central United Kingdom between 1932 and 1948, and by extension from 1948 to 2010, could be attributed to

1. a heating proportional to the amount of bright sunshine received, the amount of bright sunshine changing through time in a quasi-sinusoidal manner with a cycle time of 62 years,
2. a quasi-sinusoidal heating and cooling with a 56 year peak-to-peak frequency, and
3. a minor, long-term, consistent heating of about 0.10C/century.

These three factors were isolated from the temperature/sunshine records, idealized and expressed separately (Fig. 10). To determine whether the deconstruction/idealization process introduced errors, the isolated portions were re-integrated and compared to the original data profile (Fig. 11). The fit is good.

The fit of original and reconstructed profiles is good does not, of course, show more than that the mathematical deconstruction was internally consistent. A way to check that the hypotheses behind the deconstruction are correct (or at least consistent with observation) is to extend the observed data backward to a period in which data not included in the study can be used as a comparison. Such data for the Central UK area was not available to this author at the time of writing, but data for the Northern Latitudes, for which the Central UK data was considered a good proxy, was available.

In Figure 12 the reconstructed temperature data with extensions is overlain on GISTemp profiles of the Northern and other Latitudes groupings, as well as the Global Meteorological Land Stations [http://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/graphs/. ]The period 1860 to 1932 for all profiles matches reasonably well with both reconstruction and hindcast extensions. The prior period of Southern Latitudes also matches reasonably well (though the modern period of 1960 – 2000 does not).

The hypotheses that

1) the three identified patterns are sufficient to explain the temperature rise of the Central UK (and other regions), and

2) that the recent past can be used to hindcast the further past,

both appear confirmed.

The Non-Linear Factors

The attribution of much of the temperature rise in the Central UK to increased amounts of sunshine requires little explanation. Each time the sun “moves from behind” clouds and we, the air and the environment around us warms, is observable proof that temperatures rise with more sunshine. The mathematical relationship between added sunshine and increased temperature, as shown to be consistent and linear, fits in with general observations that the top of atmosphere (i.e. TOA) solar insolation has not changed over the last 150 years. The quasi-sinusoidal temperature portion of the record and the quasi-sinusoidal variation in time of the number of sunshine hours require further explanation.

The explanation offered here is recognized as not directly providing the causations: the patterns show up because, in the natural world, the same patterns show up elsewhere, have done so for centuries, and are unrelated to man or his activities in the world. These are the patterns are those of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO) and Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation (AMO) (Fig. 13 & 14) (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pacific_decadal_oscillation &http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atlantic_multidecadal_oscillation) . The PDO and AMO cycles are sufficiently studied and understood, however, that attribution of part of the Central UK temperature profile to the mechanisms of the PDO-AMO cycles is legitimately more of an explanation than a rationalization.

The PDO and the AMO reflect periodic release and storage of oceanic heat with cycles of 20 or 30 years for the Pacific Ocean, and 60 years for the Atlantic. Each of the oceanic basins shows a warming and cooling pattern with a similar, one-half or one-third cycle period of the observed quasi-sinusoidal temperature factor (Fig. 14a, b & c). Neither one nor the other, however, quite matches time-wise the highs and lows of the reconstructed Central UK record (Fig. 14d, e & g). A non-proportional combination of the PDO and AMO, although not done here, appear likely to fit the reconstructed record enough to suggest that the observed heating pattern in the Central UK is derived from the oceanic heating and cooling cycles. It is also noteworthy that the Southern Latitude profile, an area dominated by the Southern Ocean/Antarctica, matches the UK record least: if the oceans are responsible for much of the Central UK temperature patterns, the Atlantic, and then the Pacific, would reasonably be considered more of an influence than the Southern.

By invoking the PDO and the AMO as an explanation for the temperature changes, the mechanisms by this occurs have not, of course, been explained, but the source of the mechanisms is said to be found. As well, the PDO and AMO events are well known and studied. Whatever the causes for the PDO/AMO events, they are invoked here as the primary cause of the patterns showing up in the Central UK temperature record.

At the same time, the quasi-sinusoidal variation of sunshine hours has no intuitive foundation in the PDO/AMO cycles. It is possible that the amount of sunshine hours, i.e. cloudiness, is influenced by but not created by, those factors that induce such patterns in the global oceans. The cause for change of cloudiness, not its expression, lies elsewhere.

The three factors as revealed in this study – cloudiness, PDO-AMO heat release and storage, and a minor long-term heating factor – appear sufficient to explain local, regional and global heating and cooling patterns without recourse to the CO2-villain of the Global Warming story. CO2 growth has been approximately linear for the last 50 years (Fig. 15, http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/gmd/ccgg/trends/), a pattern that matches none of those determined here. Further, if these natural, cycling factors are the principal determinants of temperatures, then the forecast (Fig. 10d) is for a planet cooling in the years ahead. For the Central UK, this entails a drop in maximum temperatures of approximately 0.96C by 2040, with an increase in cloudiness of about 2.5% – a return to the conditions of 1970. Comparing the changes of the Central UK to that of the world, it appears the global change would be a drop of about 0.7C, and an increase in cloudiness of about 1.8% (by a quantitative comparison of specific temperature changes of the Central UK and the globe).

The amount of CO2 is increasing in the atmosphere each day. Based on observations made here of the previous 80 years, however, both regional and global temperatures are not expected to have any discernible, let alone catastrophic, impact in the near future.

Summary & Conclusions:

The Maximum Temperatures of the Central United Kingdom area are entirely determined by

a) the amount of sunshine received, i.e. changes in cloudiness,

b) a cycling input and output of heat related to changes in energy storage and release of the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean, and

c) a very minor, long-term increase in overall temperatures.

The amount of sunshine received has a cyclic pattern similar to, but not in lockstep with, the oceanic heating and cooling cycles of the Pacific Decadal Oscillation and the Atlantic Multidecadal Oscillation.

The very minor, long-term increase in temperatures, at 0.1C/century may be related to anthropogenically produced CO2, but other factors, including artefacts of data manipulation and adjustments might be equally considered. Regardless, the amount of heating not attributable to additional sunshine or oceanic influences is minor to the point of invisibility.

CO2 as a threat to the biosphere is hereby repudiated. Nature, not man, is in charge of the current global, regional and local climate.

The coming period of 2010 to 2040 is predicted by the factors discussed here to be a time of local and global cooling and, without being dramatic, cloudiness. Temperatures are expected to drop by 0.7 to 1.0C during this period, and the amount of cloud cover increase between 1.5% and 2.5%.

In addition to determining that CO2 is not responsible for the warming of the world over the last century, the results of this study also demonstrate that “citizen-scientists” do, indeed, have the abilities to determine and reasonably comment upon matters of scientific, if not social, concern.

End Comment:

Political pollsters such as Gallup are able to create accurate pictures of the voting public because they recognize that a careful study of a small subset of the population gives a practical understanding of the positions of the whole population. If surveying everyone were necessary, the work would never be done. This analysis of the Central United Kingdom temperature, time and sunshine hours is obviously limited, but as only one individual, if representative of the nation, may consistently reflect the behaviour of the voting nation, so this study, in theory, may accurately reflect what is happening in the global temperature events of the near-past and near-future. Additional such studies obviously should be done, however.

It is suggested that a number of subsets, rather than large, merged data, be subjected to the analysis done here, i.e. at a national, rather than global/subglobal level. The reason is that the more data is averaged, the more significant patterns offset in time rather than cause, may confuse the general pattern. Plus, any diverse group of information, when combined and averaged, gives up “universals” as a mathematical construct without necessarily revealing anything about actual patterns within the data reflective of the universals. For example, the “global” temperature may have no more meaning than an average height of 5’ 6” to describe a room filled half with giants and half with dwarfs. In this example, a description of the separate characteristics of the height –enhanced and height-challenged would be more useful. The same may apply to the world’s climate.

The Central United Kingdom has, by the data reviewed, a non-bright sunshine history of 70%; Constable and Turner showed us in the 19^th century that much of this was due to sustained low and middle altitude clouds. A bright sunshine and maximum temperature dataset from, say, the Arctic, where upper clouds are more prevalent would be interesting. One from a seasonally cloudy area, like Vancouver or San Francisco, where the Pacific Decadal Oscillation would be more significant, would be also informative. Australia, with its boom-and-bust cycle of flooding and droughts, would be another good candidate.

Again: if globally distributed CO2 changes the dynamics of the atmosphere, the results are everywhere. The small will reflect the large. If the small doesn’t reflect the large, then the “large” is an artefact, not an observation.